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Permission to professional students of the university to occupy
rooms in certain of the dormitories, which has been taken advantage
of this year only to a slight extent, bids fair by another year to be
more sought after, as this possibility becomes better known. It is
another step towards the realization of the university ideal, the
wiping out of certain departmental lines and limitations: To be
sure it does not go quite so far as had been hoped, in that academic
seniors wishing to spend further time in study cannot in every
case retain their campus rooms, thus putting the force of inertia
on the side of continued residence. But if men desire this, it ought
in time to be conceded also. Extensive occupancy of campus rooms
by members of all departments is very unlikely. A sprinkling of
professional students, however, amongst academic undergraduates,
we believe, would be beneficial to both, conducing to orderliness, to
seriousness of purpose, and to unity of university life. In availing
themselves of this privilege, men should understand that their
occupancy must be stable, for the entire year, subject to good be-
havior, and that charges must be promptly paid. Otherwise the
system will break down. Subject to these conditions there is no
reason why an entry, or a floor at least, should not be packed by a
congenial set, and the intolerable sense of loneliness, which is such
a bar to the return of academic graduates for further study here, be-
in great measure relieved.
EDITORIAL.
The emphasis laid on the solidarity and unity of the University
which is one of the striking features of to-day, is seen in a minor
way in a new feature of our smoking room.
Record boards have been set up there, which are inscribed with
the names of those members of the Law School who have won
distinction in the intellectual or athletic life of the whole university.
The winners of the John A. Porter prize, members of university
debating teams, captains of university teams, along with our own
Townsend prize winners; these are recorded and are to be re-
corded, to minister to our own esprit de corps, and to show the
part we play in the university life, and this is well. Loyalty,
enthusiasm, the Yale spirit, qualities which we all honor, are not
confined to one department or to one locality. We are all members
of one family, with no more right to the family name belonging to
one than to another. When this simple truth is fully realized by
all branches of Yale, and not till then, will Yale be a university
indeed.
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THE ORIGIN OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION.
At the meeting of the American Bar Association at Saratoga
Springs, in August last, Mr. Amasa M. Eaton of Providence, Rhode
Island, read a paper on "The Origin of Municipal Incorporation in
England and in the United States." The paper is to be published
in full in the Proceedings of the Association, and it will deserve a
careful reading by all persons who are at all interested in the
subject of Municipal Incorporation. In 1722 Thomas Madox, in
his Preface to "Firma Burgi" wrote: "Whoso desireth to discourse
in a proper manner concerning corporated towns and communities,
must take in a great variety of matter and should be allowed a great
deal of time and preparation. The subject is extensive and difficult."
Mr. Eaton's paper begins very appropriately with this quotation
from Madox. While the paper covers some eighty printed pages-
a somewhat unusual length for a paper before the Bar Association
-it is difficult to see how the author could have compressed satis-
factorily his subject matter into much less space. No student of
the subject will be inclined to complain about the length of the
paper, and no student of the subject can afford not to read it in its
entirety. It is an able and learned presentation of an important
subject. and a distinct and valuable contribution to the literature of
that subject. That Mr. Eaton has spent a great deal of time in his
investigation of the matter his paper makes evident.
In the United States two opposing views are held as to the rela-
tion of town and State. One is that the State is absolutely para-
mount; that it created the towns, has absolute power over them and
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
,an destroy them-if it pleases-taking from them at its pleasurc
ie local self-government it has temporarily allowed. The other
i.. that towns and cities are endowed with a certain limited sovereign
power over their own local affairs, free from the control or inter-
ference of the State. Mr. Eaton declares that the problem which
this conflict in theory presents is too difficult and complicated for
solution "unless we go back to the beginning of Municipal Incorpo-
ration in England and ascertain the principles on which it rests."
He accordingly goes back to the beginning. His conclusion of the
matter is that the right to local self-government was and remains
still a fundamental Anglo-Saxon right, and was brought to this
country by the first settlers. "The rights of municipal corporations,
therefore, are not subject to the uncontrolled and uncontrollable
will of the legislature any more than are other fundamental Anglo-
Saxon rights, and local self-government itself cannot be interfered
with by the legislature, even if the State constitution be silent on
the subject, reserving always to the legislature power over all
general legislation and power to mould the exercise of town power
when requested by a town itself."
We find no reference in Mr. Eaton's learned paper to the case
of State v. Williams, 68 Conn. 131. This oversight is noticeable,
as he has noted the cases elsewhere decided, which support the
same theory as to the right of the legislature to take from the towns
their rights and privileges. That case is also noteworthy because
of the very able dissenting opinion which the late Chief Justice
Andrews delivered and which strongly supports Mr. Eaton's con-
tention. In the course of the opinion of the court, which was
written by Judge Baldwin, it is said of the Constitution of Con-
necticut:
"It secured to these territorial sub-divisions (towns and counties)
of the State certain political privileges in perpetuity. * * * It
secured them because it granted them; not because they previously
existed. Towns have no inherent rights. They have always been
the mere creatures of the Colony or the State, with such functions
and such only as were conceded or recognized by law."
Mr. Eaton, we think, is somewhat unnecessarily severe in his
criticism of the Supreme Court of the United States. He quotes
the dictum of that court in Bloom field v. Chartcr Oak Bank, 121
U. S. 121 (1887), in which the court said:
"Towns in Connecticut, as in the other New England States,
differ from trading companies, or even from municipal corporations
elsewhere. They are territorial corporations, into which the State
is divided by the legislature from time to time, for political purposes
and the convenient administration of government; they have those
powers only, which have been expressly conferred upon them by
statute, or which are necessary for conducting municipal affairs;
and all the inhabitants of the town are members of the quasi
corporation."
To this Mr. Eaton replies:
COMMENT.
"Imagine the amazement of a Rhode Islander upon being told
that all the inhabitants of a town are members of it! Of course it
is not intended to deny that some towns have originated through
action of the legislature-examples are given in the articles referred
to. But as a general statement of the origin and powers of towns
in New England the opinion is manifestly incorrect, and could only
have been written by one either ignorant of the facts, or reasoning
incorrectly from them. It is difficult to continue to retain the
respect for the Supreme Court of the United States it should always
command, when we find it so constantly indulging in dicta, and in
incorrect generalities foreign to the case before the court."
While we cannot sympathise with this rebuke of the Supreme
Court, we concede that there are strong reasons in support of the
theory which Mr. Eaton ably advocates. H. W. R.
CONTRACTS LIMITING THE LIABILITY OF CARRIERS FOR NEGLIGENT
INJURY TO FREE PASSENGERS.
Recent cases decided in Virginia and in the District of Columbia
afford an illustration of the direct conflict of opinion and authority
which exists among the courts of the various States in regard to
the validity of the well-known stipulation made by carriers of
passengers for exemption from liability for the negligence of their
servants, as a condition of gratuitous carriage. In N. & W. R. Co.
v. Tanncr, 41 S. E. 721 (Va.), such a stipulation is held to have
no validity, even in the case of a strictly "free pass." The Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia, in Boering z. The Chesa-
peake Beach Ry. Co., decided Nov. 5, 1902, arrives at the opposite
conclusion. Each decision is supported by authorities of weight
and number, although an examination of them fails to disclose
(what both these cases and others, and text writers as well seem to
assume), that the Virginia view is that of the majority. It does,
indeed, follow the courts of Pennsylvania, Iowa, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Texas and Alabama. But on the other side are New York,
Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, New Jersey, Georgia, Wiscon-
sin, Indiana, Washington and (except for gross negligence) Illinois.
Viewed from an international standpoint, the assumption is still
less warranted, since England, Canada, Germany, France and Italy
allow validity to these agreements. Quimby v. B. & Me. R. Co.,
150 Mass. 365, and Griswold v. N. 1. & N. E. R. Co., 53 Conn.
371. may be cited as forcible statements of this view, while Jacobus
v. St. P. & C. R. Co., 20 Minn. 125, well illustrates the contrary
authorities.
The conflict of authority is less extensive than some of the cases
would at first seem to indicate. There has often been a failure to
limit the decision to the exact facts before the court. Thus many
of the cases cited as denying the validity of exemptions in a free
pass, involved, in point of fact, passes that were not gratuitous, as
in the "Drover's Pass" cases. In others, although the passenger
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paid no consideration, he was riding by the carrier's consent or
invitation, without any stipulation whatever about liability. These
distinctions indicate the limits within which the courts of this
country, with fair unanimity, take common ground. i. If the
carriage is for hire, in any sense of that word, no stipulation for
exemption from liability for its own or its servants' negligence can
avail the carrier. 2. Where, in the absence of any stipulation, the
carriage is gratuitous, under circumstances not constituting the per-
son carried a trespasser (e. g., with the consent or by the invitation
of the carrier), his position is that of a passenger, and the carrier's
liability attaches as of course, just as in the case of other passengers.
In both classes of cases the carrier is acting in its capacity as a
carrier, and the instances of each are exceedingly numerous. There-
fore, both a logical deduction from the ordinary principles governing
common carriers of passengers, and the very practical danger which
would menace the public if carriers could in any proportionable
number of cases protect themselves from responsibility for their
negligence or that of their servants, unite in demanding that in
these cases attempted exemptions be held of no effect.
But to the case of a free passenger who has made an express
agreement relieving the carrier of liability, a discussion of the
rights and liabilities of a public carrier does not apply, nor does
any practical possibility of less vigilant management as a result
of exemption endanger the public safety, and so violate public
policy. For a common carrier of passengers is one who carries
for hire, and who is obliged to carry whoever presents himself,
under reasonable regulations, and for a reasonable compensation.
It is true that where the carriage is for hire the duty to carry safely(which we have seen cannot be abdicated), does not arise from
mere privity of contract. But it must be remembered that it does
rest upon a duty to carry, whereas there is no duty at all to carry
gratuitously. The carrier is not dictating harsh and unreasonable
terms as a condition of doing what it is legally bound to do on
reasonable terms. A railroad company does not solicit p.ersons to
make gratuitous use of its conveyances; the solicitation is wholly
from the other side. And when it yields to the importunity of one
who would be carried free, it puts off its character of public carrier,
and with it the liability of public carriers. It should be free to
impose what conditions it will, before consenting to do that which
it is under no obligation, legal or moral, to do at all.
In considering the relation of public policy to the class of con-
tracts under discussion, it is admitted that whatever has an obvious
tendency to encourage negligence in the performance of the carrier's
public duties cannot be tolerated. But that these contracts have
any such tendency is denied. Looking at the matter in a practical
way (for the law is a practical science), it is a fair conclusion from
the fact that carriers do business for gain and not from altruistic
considerations, that the proportion of strictly free passengers to the
whole number carried on any given train or other means of con-
veyance, may be expected to be exceedingly small. And this con-
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clusion the facts support. It would be absurd to suppose that
railroad officials would be so eager to enjoy their exemption as to
one or two or a dozen free passengers, that they would consciously
incur a vastly heavier liability in the case of the hundred or hundreds
who pay. Here, too, experience has shown no relaxation of vigi-
lance where the exemption has been upheld. When, therefore, as
a condition of gratuitous carriage, one contracts with a passenger
carrier to take upon one's self all risks, the consideration of public
policy affords no true ground for refusing to enforce the contract.
Indeed, a sound public policy would rather hold to their agreement
parties who contract upon terms of perfect equality, and would
maintain, as a vital principle of modern business life, freedom of
contract.
EXPRESS PACKAGES OF LIQUORS, C. 0. D., AND THE ORIGINAL PACKAGE
DOCTRINE.
The rapidly developing practice of ordering intoxicating liquors
sent C. 0. D. through express companies, amounting to an abuse
of the right of a consumer to purchase commodities in a foreign
State and to receive same in the original package, has received a
decisive check in the Supreme Court of Iowa.
In the late case of State v. American Express Co. et al., 92
N. W. 66, the court held that C. 0. D. shipments were not protected
by the commerce clause of the federal constitution; that the express
company was the agent of the liquor seller for the transfer of title
to the goods; that its act in making collection of bill therefor was
unlawful under the prohibitory law; that in collecting the purchase
price for vendors the transportation company was in fact selling
liquors at retail, and that the "Original Package" doctrine in such
cases does not apply.
On the doctrine thus laid down the court also in the case of
Latta v. U. S. Express Co., 92 N. W. 68, ordered the abatement as
a nuisance of the building wherein the express company conducted
C. 0. D. business in intoxicating liquors.
A point raised was "whether a C. 0. D. transaction should be
deemed an absolute sale on the part of the vendor, with a provision
for withholding delivery until actual payment, so as to preserve a
lien for the price, or as an executory contract of sale which is not
completed until actual delivery to the buyer." The court relied on
the parallel case of State v. U. S. Ex'press Co.. 70 Iowa 271, wherein
it was held that liquors so transported were the property of the
consig-nors, and that the company was the agent of the shipper;
and upon O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, a similar case wherein
a judgment of conviction against an agent connected with the sale
was affirmed. The decision of Rhodes v. Ioza, 170 U. S. 412. the
court said, did not militate against the conclusion. Rhodes v. Iowa
is a leading case, which arose under the Wilson Original Package
Act (26 Stat. L. 313), wherein the United States Supreme Court
held that a box of liquors while in transit within the State from a
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point without, before arrival and delivery, is protected against the
State's power to condemn it, being interstate commerce.
The Iowa mulct liquor law and anti-cigarette acts (see Iowa v.
McGrego r, 76 Fed. 956, and McGregor v. Cone, io4 Iowa 465;
also Lazrie v. Tennessee, 82 Fed. 615, and Austin v. State, IOI
Tenn. 563), being the parents of the Original Package cases, it
would seem that the effect of these Express Company cases would
be far reaching and practically final.
It was also lately decided in Iowa, State v. Hanaphy, 90 N. W.
6oi, that the law prohibiting a traveling salesman from soliciting or
accepting orders to be filled by a foreign liquor house, the goods to
be shipped C. 0. D., was not within the scope of the Wilson Act
and unconstitutional as infringing upon interstate commerce.-
The lines are thus gradually being re-established in 'prohibition'
States after the upheaval a few years ago caused by the Original
Package decisions.
STATE ANTI-TRUST LEGISLATION.
The States are experiencing not a little difficulty with their
anti-trust laws. While they unquestionably can, under their police
power, pass laws against combinations for the purpose of monopoly
and restraint of competition, still they have found it troublesome
to determine just where to stop. On the one hand they can not
make their laws so broad as to be oppressive and in violation of
the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Constitution; bn the
other, they can not make them so narrow that they operate upon
certain classes and exclude from their. operation certain others,
thus becoming discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The tendency on the part of most of the State anti-trust
laws thus far passed, is to exempt from their operation certain
lines of trade and commerce peculiar to the particular locality. This
tendency has proved fatal to the anti-trust laws of Texas, Nebraska
and Illinois, which have all been declared unconstitutional sub-
stantially on the ground that they were discriminatory. Texas
made an exemption in favor of the original producer or raiser of
agricultural products or live stock; Nebraska undertook to exempt
assemblies or associations of laboring men; and Illinois made its
law not to apply to agricultural products and live stock in the
hands of the raiser. In re Grice, 79 Fed. 627; Ins. Co. v. Cornell,
iiO Fed. 816; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 22 Sup. Ct. 431.
The Supreme Court of Kansas has lately, by a divided court,
decided the anti-trust law of Kansas, passed in 1897, to be con-
stitutional. This law is different from the three mentioned above,
in that it makes no exception in favor of any specific kind of
commerce. Hence the question as to whether it is constitutional
or not depends upon whether or not it is too broad. In other
words-whether or no it does not itself unreasonably restrain trade
and violate freedom of contract. In deciding this the court had
no starting point save that it is unquestionably within the power of
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the State to prohibit the restriction of trade and competition. For,
although the U. S. Supreme Court had occasion recently to pass upon
the constitutionality of the Illinois anti-trust law in Connelly v.
Scwer Pipe Co., 22 Sup. Ct. 431, they failed to leave any guiding
principle for such cases as this, being content to rest their decision
solely upon the ground that the law was of a discriminatory
character.
The law in question, after defining a trust, in the first section,
to be "a combination of capital, skill or acts, by two or more
persons, firms, corporations, or associations of persons, or either
two or more of them, for either, any or all of the following pur-
poses," makes substantially these specifications: First-The cre-
ation or operation of any restraint of commerce or trade, or any
aids to commerce or trade. Second-A manipulation of prices of
commodities, or control of rates or cost of insurance. Third-The
prevention of competition either in trade, manufacture, transporta-
tion, or aids to commerce. Fourth-The control or increase of
the price of commodities intended for public consumption. Fifth
-The making or entering into any contract for any of these
purposes, or in restraint of trade or competition generally. The
second section of the act denies the right of any person to be
interested directly or indirectly, either as principal, agent, repre-
sentative, consignee, or otherwise, in a trust as defined in the first
section. And subsequent sections make such interest criminal and
prescribe penalties.
A careful examination of the court's opinion gives the impres-
sion that aside from its contention that the act should be limited in
its operation according to the intention of the legislature, which was
that it should not extend beyond constitutional bounds, and that
objection to the constitutionality of a law can only be made by one
to whom it applies, the court itself was not entirely satisfied that
the act could be upheld. In fact, without this questionable rule of
construction, it is difficult to see how the law could be sustained. It
is too broad and sweeping in its effect. So much so that we think
it would be open to the objections made in the Illinois case, su pra.
There, the court, to show that the statute was so broad as to be
unreasonable and oppressive, said that under it, if valid, two village
grocers doing business at a loss could not unite in a partnership
to save themselves from ruin; two farmers could not, each having
a half car-load of potatoes, join together to ship in one car to get
a reduced rate, etc. These illustrations seem within dangerous
proximity to the language of the Kansas statute. For instance: by
the fifth specification of section one, a combination "by two or
more persons," among other things, "to keep the price of such
articles, commodities or transportation, at a fixed or graded figure;
or by which they shall in any manner establish or settle the price
of any article or conimodity or transportation between them or
between themselves and others, to preclude a free and unrestricted
competition," etc., is prohibited. And if the Illinois case is good
law, the Kansas statute is manifestly unconstitutional unless the
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court's theory in construing the statute to be constitutional by
limiting its operation, in spite of its language, to only those objects
intended by the legislature, is correct.
It is a cardinal principle of construction that where part of a
statute is constitutional and part unconstitutional, if separable,
that which is constitutional will be upheld, provided enough is left
to make the law enforceable. State v. Copeland, 3 R. I. 33; CoMr
inonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray 485. But it may be well ques-
tioned as to how far a court may go in the application of this
principle where the language and meaning of the statute are clear.
Lirritation of the operation of a law so that it will not extend beyond
its constitutional bounds, can not properly be said to be separation.
And an attempt at limitation in such a case is likely to result in
the substitution of the judicial department of the government for
the legislative. This point is discussed fully in U. S. V. Reese,
92 U. S. 214.
WHO IS A "TRADER" UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT.
Who is a trader and what constitutes a trading has been thc
subject of much legal discussion during the past hundred and fifty
years. These questions have arisen under the various English
and United States bankruptcy acts, and have resulted in numerou-
decisions, which indicate their application to the. various lines oi
industry.
To constitute a trading under the old English bankruptcy act'
there must have been a buying and selling with a view to profit, witl"
an intent to seek a living. Selling what you already possess cr
produce is not sufficient, nor is a single act of buying and selling
enough, unless there is an intention to continue it. Er parte Mool.t,
14 Ves. Jun. 603; Parker v. Wells, I T. R. 34; Heannay v. Birci-,
3 Camp. 233; Cooke, 48, 73. A more modern and commerci:l
definition of a trader is one who makes it his business to brv
merchandise or things ordinarily the subject of commerce and traffi.
and to sell the same for the purpose of making a profit. It "
Cowzles, I B. R. 42.
Some difficulty has arisen in defining "trading" and "mercanti;,
pursuits" in section 4b of the 1898 bankruptcy act, and in applying
that definition to aetermine its applicability to the business of buyin:-,
and selling bonds, stocks and other securities. The recent case cf
In re Surety and Guarantee Trust Co., Central Law Jour.,Vol. 55,
No. I8 (Oct. 31 ), decides that "trader" and "mercantile pursuits" are
to be construed in their technical sense, and that the buying and
selling of stocks is not a "trading pursuit" within the meaning of
the act.
Among those who have been held to be "traders" within the
meaning of the bankruptcy acts of 1841 and 1867 are the following:
a baker, who buys flour, which he makes into bread, and sells the
bread daily to his customers (In re Cocks, 3 Ben. 260) ; a man who
boards horses (In re Odell, 9 Ben. 209); a saloonkeeper (In re
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Sherwood, 9 Ben. 66); a butcher (In re Garrison, 5 Ben. 430);
a livery stable keeper (Hall v. Cooley, Fed. Cas. No. 5928): not
within the act are a railroad contractor (In re Smith, 2 Lowell, 69) ;
one engaged in farming and trading live stock (In re Ragsdale, 7
Biss. 154); nor are those within the act who buy and sell merely
as incidental to their main occupation. In re Chapman, 9 Ben. 311;
In re Kimball, 7 Fed. 461; In re Duff, 4 Fed. 519.
Under the 1898 act the courts seem to restrict the meaning of
"trading and mercantile pursuits." They see that in its broadest
sense mercantile pursuits would include almost every business.
They hold that Congress, as it named specifically a few businesses
only and left the rest unmentioned, meant that "trading and mer-
cantile pursuits" should have -a restrictive meaning and not be
broadened to cover the whole field of commerce. In re Phila. &
Lanes Transp. Co., 114 Fed. 403. In conformity with such a view
have been almost all the decisions under the recent bankruptcy act.
Thus, mining companies are held not to be traders (In re Park
Mining Co., ioi Fed. 422); (In re Tetopa Mining Co., iio Fed.
120) ; nor insurance companies (In re Cameron Company, 96 Fed.
756) ; nor a water company (In re New York Water Co., 98 Fed.
711) ; nor the keeper of a saloon and a restaurant (In re Chesapeake
Fish Co., 112 Fed. 96o) ; etc. There are, however, two cases which
seem to more or less conflict with the great majority of decisions
under the 1898 act, following the more liberal interpretation of
the word "trader" as seen in the old English decisions and those
under our own previous bankruptcy acts. These two cases are fi
re Gabriel Sanitarium, 95 Fed. 271, and In re Morton Boarding
Stables, io8 Fed. 791, which hold respectively that a corporation
maintaining a private hospital for consumptives and a corporation
conducting boarding stables are traders.
As to whether the buying and selling of stocks and bonds is a
trading or mercantile pursuit there are exceedingly few decisions.
Under the bankruptcy law of England it is said to have been held
that dealing in shares in joint stock companies was not trading
within the meaning of the act; In re Cleland, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 466;
but in this case the dealing in stock was only incidental to the main
business; the appellant there did not act as broker or factor, nor
did he buy and sell for a profit, but merely to oblige his friends.
Analagous to the English case is that of In re Marston, 5 Ben. 313,
in which the buying and selling of stock by the bankrupt was
casual. Later in In re Woodward, 8 Ben. 563, it was squarely
decided that the business of buying and selling stock was not a trad-
ing pursuit. This case is not discussed at length and would not
seem to conform to many of the other decisions under the 1867 act.
The present case is in harmony with most of the decisions under
the 1898 act, which as said above, tend to restrict the meaning of
"trader" and mercantile pursuits to the technical sense in which
they are known to the law, and is important as excluding one more
occupation from the operation of the bankruptcy law.
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EXPERT TESTIMONY AS TO HANDWRITING.
Caligraphic experts have for years asserted the possibility c
investigating handwriting upon scientific principles, and the cour':
have consequently admitted such persons to testify in cases o:
disputed handwriting. It is claimed that experiments and ob-
servation have disclosed the fact that there are certain genera
principles which may be relied upon in questions pertaining to th.
genuineness of handwriting. Rogers, Expert Testimony, 2nd ed
sec. 124. But testimony of experts as to handwriting will be zeal-
ously scrutinized, they being generally selected by the party in
whose behalf it is given, and there being no standard, as in case of
medical or chemical experts, whereby to test the soundness of
the opinions advanced. Sarvent -. Hcsdra, 5 Redf. Surr. 47. To
such an extent has the testimony of this kind sought to be admitted
that in many of the States statutes have been enacted regulating
and determining the admissibility of such evidence. The law as
it exists in the different States, however, is by no means uniform.
Rogers, Expert Testivony, sec.. i9o. The extent of this class of
expert evidence is clearly seen when it appears that a noted hand-
writing expert of New York City, in qualifying as an expert in
a recent case, stated that lie had given expert evidence in some
eight hundred cases. It is only within the last few years that the
greatest latitude has been allowed in introducing this class of evi-
dence. The nisi prius decisions of the English courts, although
not in entire harmony (Allesbrook v. Roach, I Esp. 35), and much
criticised by text writers, were generally hostile to the admission of
comparisons by experts until the act of Parliament in 1854 (17 and
i8 Vict. c. 125. seCs. 27, 103; 28 and 29 Vic. c. 18, secs. 1, 8) ; while
in Doe v. Suckermore, 5 Ad. and El. 703, the court evenly divided
whether an expert in handwriting could testify as to the genuine-
ness of a signature in comparison with other genuine signatures.
But such evidence is now always admissible in this country.
The consequences of the admission of expert testimony as to
handwriting was notably presented in the celebrated Molineux trial
in New York. The court there held that the New York statute
admitting such evidence was intended to enlarge the rule established
at common law, which was too inelastic, as it frequently excluded
from the consideration of the court testimony which common
experience proved to be helpful. People v. Molineux, i68 N. Y.
264. In the very recent case, In re Hopkins' Will, 65 N. E. 173
(Nov., 19o2), the New York Court of Appeals. reversing all the
lower courts, has placed a wise restriction upon the value to be
given evidence of this character. Here it was attempted to prove
by the testimony of aii expert that fourteen perpendicular marks
dawn through the signature to a will were made by a person other
than the signer of the will. While one may perhaps have a strong
opinion that mere marks can be identified, yet it is apparent that
such evidence is entirely too circumstantial to admit of value as
evidence; and furthermore mere marks cannot be considered as
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handwriting. Bouvier, Law Dictionary. There is no ,i!T'rence
between this and the opinion of experts as to the auihoislhip of a
mark made for a signature. The courts have very generally held
that a mere mark cannot be identified. Shinkle v. Crock, 17 Pa.
St. 159; Gilliam v. Parkinson, 4 Rand (Va.) 325; Jones Z,. Hough,
77 Ala. 437; Watts z. Kilb urn, 7 Ga. 316; Travers v. Schneider,
38 IIl. App. 382; Jackson v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns. 154; State v.
Byrd, 93 N. C. 626; Tageas Co. v. Mahnoris Huns, 5 La. 324;
2 Benth. .ud. Er. 461. In Collins z. Crockcr, 15 Ill. App. 107, a
line in ink was drawn through the words "if not paid at maturity,"
and the court very properly held that the identity of this mark
was not a question for expert testimony. This is very similar to
the evidence sought to be admitted in In re Hopkins' Will, supra,
and it certainly seems the common sense and practical rule. Al-
though testimony may be admissible to prove whether an alteration
was made before or after the date of the instrument, by an expert's
knowledge of the effect and duration of chemicals; Ross v. Se-
bastian, 16o Il. 6o2, 43 N. E. 708; Dubois v. Baker, 30 N. Y. 355;
yet it would be carrying the principle too far, to admit opinions of
experts that mere marks were made by some person other than one
wkh whose signature they are compared. In many cases the evi-
dence might be strong, but it is too unsatisfactory and misleading
to be admitted, and so properly should be excluded. The New
York Court of Appeals is to be commended for the check it has
placed on the admission of expert testimony as to handwriting.
